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The origins of lender of last resort theory are so remote to contemporary 
policymakers that  the underlying principles usually are not discernible.  Even 
while  the  theory  was  evolving  over  the  last  200  years,  it  usually  was 
imperfectly understood, even by its makers. 
The principal change in the  theory, which was reasonably well understood 
in  England  into the  1880s and  in  the United States into the  1960s, involves 
the  role  of  the  lender  of  last  resort  as a source of solvency or  capital 
support,  as  distinguished  from  liquidity  support.  The  bases  in  logic  and 
economic  theory  for  solvency or capital support from a central bank, or from 
the  Treasury  when  it  acts  as  a  monetary  authority,  are  poorly  defined, 
especially  when  most  contemporary  economists  acknowledge  the  importance of 
open-market  operations as  the  principal  instrument  of  monetary policy.  A 
solvency or capital rescue operation is better undertaken through the fiscal 
operations of the Treasury, in a manner that requires appropriations of funds 
on  the  public  record  and  clear  lines  of  political  accountability  for  the 
actions  taken.  That  is  how similar  operations  were  performed  in  the U.S. 
during the 1930s. 
The  often-expressed  desire  to  have  the  central  bank  fund  solvency  or 
capital  support  efforts  on  a  grand  scale  suggests  that  considerations of 
political convenience, not  necessity, underlie that  desire, which is strange 
indeed when we recall that one of the fundamental principles of public finance 
is  that  the  central  bank  should  not  fund  the  Treasury's  deficits. Prefatorv Ouotations 
But  [in  19331  the  debates  over  money,  the  gold  standard  and  banking 
continued.  Congress  was  being  importuned  by  telegram,  by  telephone,  by 
letter,  and  by  Administration pressure  to write  into law  the  guaranty  of 
bank  deposits by  the Federal  Government. 
To  this Glass  was  opposed,  pointing out: 
"Is  there  any  reason  why  the  American  people 
should  be  taxed  to guarantee  the  debts  of banks, 
any  more  than  they  should  be  taxed  to guarantee 
the  debts  of  other  institutions,  including  the 
merchants,  the  industries,  and  the  mills of the 
country?" 
His calm logic was  to  go  unheeded. 
--  From  Ri  xey  Smith and  Norman  Beasl  ey ,'  Carter Glass :  A  Bioaraphy  357  (1  939, 
reprinted 1972). 
Liquidity.  The  state  of  Cassetsl ... readily  converted  into cash:  liquid 
assets. 
Sol vencv :  [The  state of  assets1 capable of  meeting financial obligations. 
Cap1  tal  :  The  remaining  assets  of a  business  after  all  liabilities have 
been  deducted;  net worth. 
Bai  lout:  A  rescue  from financial difficulties. 
-- The  American  Heritaae Dictionary,  2nd  College Edition (1982,  1985). 
I. Oriains of Lender  of  Last Resort  Theory  and  Objectives of this Paper 
The  origins of a  coherent  theory  of the  lender  of last resort  (LLR)  are 
attributed  to the  English  economist  Henry  Thornton  (1802),  a1  though  faint 
glimmerings  of  the  theory  may  be  found  in Adam  Smith  (1776).  Whichever political  economist  is  deemed  father  of the  theory,  the  current  thinking and 
practice  of policymakers,  lawyers,  and  even  monetary  economists  has  become 
somewhat  muddled--it clearly is  time for a refresher  course. 
The  current  crop  of actual  and  potential  LLR  cases  is quite  ripe for the 
harvest.  For  example,  the  intriguing  case  of the  Financial  Corporation  of 
America  (FCA),  a  large  California  savings  and  loan  holding  company  that 
continues  to operate  with  a  blanket  guarantee  (guarantee  of payment  to all 
classes  of credi  tors)  from  the  Federal  Savi  ngs  and  Loan  Insurance  Corporation 
(FSLIC)  while  its principal  thrift institution subsidiary  is insolvent,  even 
by  generous  regulatory  accounting  standards,  takes  us  into  unexplored 
territory:  no  depository  institution in the  history of the United States  has 
remai  ned  open,  whi 1  e  pub1 i  cly acknowledged  to be  insolvent  ,  with a  guarantee 
of deposits  from an  insurance  fund that is,  by  the  published  statements  of its 
own  spokesmen,  also insolvent.  2 
Other  cases  have  arisen,  involving  energy  and  real  estate  loans  in the 
Southwest,  in which  all  parties  involved  may  be  insolvent:  customers  of 
underlying  borrowers,  underlying  borrowers,  lending  banks  and  savings  and 
loans,  and  deposit  insurance entities  (FSLIC).  Even  the full faith and  credit 
of the United States  is  not what  it  used  to  be:  the national  debt  will exceed 
$2.5  trillion by  the  end  of  fiscal  year  1988,  and  the U.S.  is estimated  to be 
the  world's  largest  foreign  debtor  (about  $400  billion of net  debt  of  all 
classes  of domestic  borrowers  owed  to all classes  of foreign  lenders  --  the 
net  interhational  investment  position--by  year-end  1987).  So,  if there  ever 
was  a proper  time for a brief review of LLR  theory,  that time  is  now. 
The  principal  objectives  of  this  paper  ar-e  to  restate  coherent 
distinctions between  liauiditv and  solvencv,  between  discount  window  and  open market  operations of the  central  bank  (Federal  Reserve),  and  between  legal  and 
pol i  ti  cal  necessi tv and  convenience i  n  mounti ng  rescue  operations  through  the 
central  bank,  as  opposed  to through  directly  and  pol i  ti  cal  ly  accountable 
entities.  The  paper  does  not deal  with questions  involving the  international 
LLR--but it does  seem  probable  that convenience  is  the  driving factor  in that 
issue,  not necessity. 
Enough  fragments  of  and  di  sti  nctions  among  historical  accounts  of  LLR 
actions  are  pieced  together  in this  paper  to establish  a  framework  for 
analysis  of the  discrete  European  and  American  versions  of LLR  theory.  The 
European  version  would  have  the  central  bank  rescue  insolvent  individual 
enterprises  to forestall  broader,  allegedly  systemic  problems  (a  theory  born 
i  n  European  traditions of pol i  ti  cal  expediency,  cal  led here  the  "convenience" 
theory).  On  the  other  hand,  the  American  version  of  the  LLR  theory 
historically  has  restricted the  central  bank's  assistance  to mere  liquidity 
support  of  individual  banks,  on  the  security of sound  assets,  and  has  left the 
question  of rescues  of  insolvent  enterprises  to Congress  and  the  Treasury. 
Because  the  American  LLR  intervenes  only  in accordance  with  established 
constitutional  and  statutory authority,  the  American  LLR  theory  is  called here 
the "necessity" theory. 
The  coherent  rationale underlying  the  American  or necessity  theory  of the 
LLR  is that  the  monies  provided  in a  rescue  operation belong  to the  public, 
after  all,  not  to  private  entrepreneurs  or  to  entities  (either  the 
well-connected  or  the  too-big-to-let-fail).  that  are  capable  of  taking 
advantage  of the  unfettered di  scretion of pol i  fi  cal  agents.  According  to the 
necessity  theory,  LLR  rescue  operations  should  be  administered  with  a  view 
toward f i  nanci  a1  prudence  in the  admi ni  stration of pub1 i  c  funds  and  paramount necessity,  as  distinguished  from  considerations  of  political  expediency, 
convenience,  saving face, and  the  like.  Under a  necessity framework, either 
explicit  constitutional  or  statutory  authorization,  or  clear  and  direct 
political  accountability, are  required  to justify  a  rescue operation --  and 
quite  possibly  both  are  required.  Otherwise,  allegations  that  the  LLR  is 
being abused for the benefit of the rich and the not-so-rich-but-well- 
connected tend to  acquire the ring of truth. 
This  distinction  between  a  convenience  theory  and  a  necessity  theory of 
the  LLR  illustrates  the  fundamental  cleavage  in  the  -  history  of  American 
political  and  economic  thought,  from  the  founding  of  the  republic  to the 
present  day.  Essentially,  that  division  is  between  Thomas  Jefferson,  the 
exponent .of  clear necessity  as the  underpinning for all  governmental  action, 
on  the  one  hand,  and  Alexander  Hamilton,  the  exponent  of  broad,  liberal 
constructions of  governmental  authority  and  of  reducing .necessity  to little 
more  than  mere  convenience, on the  other  hand.3  The  division  in  American 
LLR  theory also is essentially the same as that between the views of those who 
favor  rules  over  discretion  in  the  conduct of  monetary  policy,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  those  who  see  no  reason  to  limit  the  discretion  of  monetary 
policymakers, on the other hand.  What is puzzling is how frequently those who 
describe  themselves  as  belonging  to  the  former  camp  in  monetary  policy 
blithely  follow  propositions  favoring  an  activist,  interventionist, 
discretionary  LLR.~ If  the  theory  of  the  LLR  is  to  be  coherent  and 
consistent, it must be stated  in  terms that are consistent with  the relevant 
aspects of other monetary theories. 11.  Theoretical Origins of the LLR:  Europe 
Most  of the  discussions of  the  LLR  that have  been  hallowed  by  the  passage 
of  time  were  written  in  the  gold-standard  era.  Thus,  a  classical  or 
neoclassical  explanation  of  the  capacitv  of  the  LLR  to  intervene  in a 
financial  crisis necessarily  includes  the  concept  that  the  LLR  itself can  go 
broke --  become  insolvent.  -  This  insolvency  traditionally manifested itself in 
a suspension  of the central  bank's  or Treasury's  redemption of its obligations 
in specie,  in the  heat  of  a  financial  panic.6  Some  writers  have  recognized 
the  external  limitations on  what  a  central  bank  may  do  in  fulfilling the  LLR 
function by  suggesting  that central  banks  should not attempt  to act as  LLR  by 
themselves  and  that LLR  assistance  is better provided  in the  "lifeboat" model 
followed  by  the  Bank  of England  since  the  Baring  Brothers  crisis  in 1890. 
That  is,  the  central  bank  should provide  "leadership" to the other  commercial 
banks  within  its  jurisdiction  by  starting  the  1  ifeboat  operation,  while 
committing  only  a  fraction  of  the  total  support.'  This  European  or 
convenience  view  of the  LLR  sidesteps  the  question of solvency  vs.  liquidity 
and  assumes  that  discretion,  not  rules,  always  has  primacy  in practical 
political  economy.  That,  of course,  is the  essential  attractiveness  of the 
convenience  theory  of  the  LLR  for  pol  icymakers:  direct  pol i  tical 
accountability  is avoided,  or  at  least  may  be  diffused  or  deferred  until 
another  day.  But  such  an  approach  is  more  consistent  with either a centrally 
planned  or  a  mercantilist  economy  than  with  one  that  still  aspires  to 
classical  liberal  notions of a  free market.  Also,  the  convenience  theory  of 
the  LLR  offers no  consistent  or  coherent  view  of  how  central  bank  rescues  of 
the  Treasury  or  agencies  funded  by  the  Treasury  should  be  handled,8  while 
the  necessity  theory  at least has  the  intellectual  virtue of prohibiting most 
such  rescues  altogether. The  dominant  Engl i  sh  theory  of the  LLR,  beginning with Smith  and  Thornton 
and  running  through  the  formal  division of the  Bank  of England  into Banking 
and  Currency  Departments  (1844) ,'  was  expressed  in  the  views  of  Walter 
Bagehot  and  the  Banking  School  by  1873. lo Bagehot  recognized  that  an 
activist,  interventionist  LLR  might  risk  becoming  insolvent  itself if  its 
affairs were  misconducted  and,  in such  events,  might  have  to have  recourse  to 
state  aid  to cure  its  insolvency. l1  Bagehot  believed  that  the  principal 
duty of the LLR,  in  time of panic,  was  to discount  freely on  all sound  assets, 
but  at a  penalty  rate.  Bagehot  did not  be1  ieve,  however,  that  the  Bank  of 
England  should  concern  itself,  in its LLR  operations,  with  the  survival  of 
individual  dealers  --  the  penalty  rate  was  proposed  to insure  that  credit- 
worthy  firms  would  obtain  all  necessary  accommodation,  but  the  principal 
concern of the LLR  was  to  be  aggregate  liquidity in  the market place. 12 
By  1890,  the  role  model  for  the  modern  Bank  of  England  "lifeboat" 
operation  was  established.  Baring  Brothers  had  so  extended  itself  on 
Argentine  credits  that,  when  the  Argentine  defaults  began,  the  solvency  of 
Bari  ngs  was  ' threatened. l3  Recognizing  that it would  have  to suspend  specie 
redemption if it  attempted a unilateral rescue  of Barings,  the Bank  of England 
refused  a  suspension  indemnity  bill  and  organized  its  first  "lifeboat" 
operation.  In effect,  the  U.K.  banking  community  provided  Barings  enough 
solvency  or capital  support  to cover  its  outstanding liabilities. 
In mounting  the first lifeboat operation,  the  Bank  may  have  been aware  of 
simi  lar cross-lendi  ng  arrangements  (clearing  house  certificates)  that  the  New 
York  Clearing House  Association had  used  during panics  in 1873  and  1884.  But 
the  later  experience  with  Clearing  Hovze  rescues  in  New  York  was  not 
altogether  satisfactory--smaller  and  out-of-favor  members  of  the  Clearing House  were  allowed  to fail  (1907-Knickerbocker  Trust  Co.;  1930-Bank  of the 
United  States>--so  that  size  and  "connections"  seemed  to  determine  who 
received Clearing House  lifeboat rescues  and  who  did not.  The  Bank  of England 
still organizes  lifeboats,  as  with Johnson  Matthey  in 1984,  and  the  Federal 
Reserve  has  modified  the  lifeboat principle  in what  were  called  "safety  net" 
operations  in the  1970s  and  1980s--but  smaller  and  out-of-favor  banks  still 
are  allowed  to fail,  in :the  U.S.,  with  neither  safety  nets  nor  lifeboats. 
Size  and  connections  apparently  still matter  after all -- no  U.S.  bank  larger 
than $600  million total assets has  been  liquidated in toto. 
In  continental  Europe,  the  experiences  of  central  banks  in  the 
mid-nineteenth  century  also illustrated Bagehot's  observation  that they  could 
become  insolvent  through  excessive  refinancings  of  insolvent  commercial 
banks.  The  only  relevance  of the  Continental  European  experience  to this 
paper  is that it supports  the  notion  that  generous  central  bank  rediscounts, 
without  regard  to the  solvency  of the  discounting  banks  or  their  underlying 
customers,  1  ead  ultimately to  the  insolvency  of the  central  bank.  Recognizing 
this hard  fact of life in the  gold-standard era,  Continental  European  banks, 
earlier  than  the  Bank  of England,  often mounted  1  ifeboat  operations  instead, 
thereby  spreading  risks  of  insolvency. l4  In  any  case,  the  Continental 
European  experience  just  is not  part  of the  Anglo-American  legal  tradition, 
for  better  or  worse--usually  for  the  better, I  think.  In typical  Central 
European  regimes  in  the nineteenth  century,  effective,  politically accountable 
controls on  central  banking  activities  just were  not as  strong as  those  in  the 
U.K.  or U.S.,  and  such  controls  left much  to be  desired,  even  in the U.K.  and 
U.S. -8- 
111.  Theoretical Oriains of the Theory of the LLR:  America 
The traditional American concept of  the LLR  is derived  more directly from 
Adam Smith than from Thornton or Bagehot.  Smith noted, in  his account of the 
Bank of  England, that it 
advances  to government  the  annual  amount of  the 
land  and  malt  taxes,  which  are  frequently  not 
paid  up  till  some  years  thereafter  ....  It 
1  i  kewi  se discounts  merchant  bi 11  s, and  has, upon 
several  different occasions, supported  the credit 
of  the principal  houses, not only of  England, but 
of  Hamburgh and  Hol  1  and.. . .  Upon other occasions 
117451 this great company has been reduced to the 
necessity of paying in ~ix~ences.15 
The idea of  central  bank advances to the government, upon expectations of 
future tax revenues, appealed  strongly  to Alexander  Hami  1  ton, the first U.S. 
Treasury Secretary, who mentioned approvingly the "convenience of  loans to the 
government" several  times in his opinion on the constitutionality of  the First 
Bank  of  the  United  States (1791 >.  l6  Because  they  could  not  imagine  such 
loans  as anything other than  recoveries of  the  initial  capital  subscriptions 
of the First Bank, paid  in by  the government, both Speaker of  the House James 
Madison and  Secretary of  State  Thomas  Jefferson  spoke and  wrote  against the 
"convenient  loans"  rationale  for  approving  the  First  Bank's  charter.  17 
Madison  and  Jefferson  noted  that  Hami  1  ton's  arguments  were  founded  on 
tonsiderations of  mere  convenience,  which  Hamilton's  permissive  construction 
of the Constitution would have allowed, while their own strict construction of 
the Constitution would  have allowed  the  charterinu of  a  central  bank, outside 
the specifically  enumerated  powers, only  if  it  could  be  derived  by  necessary 
implication  from one or more of  the  enumerated  powers.  Madison  argued  that "the power  vested  by  the  [Bank]  bill in the  Executive,  to borrow  of the  bank 
. .  .  was  objectionable" and  observed  that constitutional  powers  that are  great 
and i  mpor tan  t 
ought  not  to  be  exercised  without  we  find 
ourselves  expressly  authorized  to  grant  them. 
Here  [Mr.  Madisonl  dilated  on  the  great  and 
extensive  influence  that  incorporated  societies 
had  on  pub1 i  c  affairs  in Europe.  They  are  a 
powerful  machi  ne,  whi ch  have  a1  ways  been  found 
competent  to effect  objects  on  principles  in a 
great measure  independent  of the People.. .  .  [Even 
if1 the  'Government  necessarily  possesses  every 
power'  [in theory1 ...  [Mr.  Madisonl  denied  that 
it [that  theor 1  applied to the Government  of the 
United States. y8 
Madison's  views  on  the  intent and  meaning  of the original Constitution of 1787 
are  significant  because  he  was  its  principal  draftsman,  kept  the  most 
extensive  (and  the  only  official)  notes  of  the  proceedings  of  the 
Consti  tutional Convention,  and  was  one  of the  three authors  of the Federal i  st 
papers  (Hamilton  and  John  Jay  were  the other two). 
Madison  further  noted,  "We  reason  . .  . ,  and  often  with  advantage,  from 
British models;  but  in the present  instance  [the  debate  on  the Bank  charter], 
there  i  s  a  great  di  ssimi lari  ty of  circumstances. "19  SO  it  is also  with 
respect  to  LLR  theory--whatever  the British or other  European  models  may  have 
been,  and  even  though  we  may  be  able  to  reason from British and  other European 
mode1 s  wi  th  advantage,  we  ought  to  recognize  that  American  tradition  and 
circumstances  are  greatly  dissimilar.  The  debate  at the  origins  of central 
banking  in the U.S.  made  it abundantly  clear  that,  notwithstanding  Hami 1  ton's 
desire  for  a  broad  grant of powers,  the  central  bank  would  be  watched  closely 
and  its  powers  interpreted  strictly--rules  over  discretion, in other  words.  President  'Jefferson
1  s  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  A1 bert 
Gallatin,  understood  these  principles and,  while he  was  favorable  to a central 
bank,  he  did  not  favor  an  LLR  that  would  protect  the  interests  of  the 
incorporated  few  against  the  interests  of  the  unincorporated  many.  That 
broader  use  of the  central  bank  was  advocated  instead  by  Henry  Clay  and  his 
followers,  but  they  were  handicapped  by  Jeffersonian  opposition  until  John 
Quincy Adams  became  President  (1825). 
When  the  Second  Bank  of  the  United  States  was  chartered  at  the  end  of 
President  Madison's  second  term  in 1816,  it continued  the  First Bank's  LLR 
tradition--no excessive  assistance  to banks  or  others  seeking  discounts  or 
redi  scounts--although one  of  the  charges  that opponents  later brought  against 
the  Second  Bank  was  that it favored  some  borrowers  (the  established  Eastern 
commerci a1  and  banking  interests)  over  others  (western  farmers  and  the ri  sing 
entrepreneurial  class  in  New  York).  Nevertheless,  Nicholas  Biddle,  the 
President  of  the  Second  Bank,  understood  clearly  the  Bank's  LLR 
responsibilities  (liquidity  support  only,  not  solvency  support),  as  revealed 
in  the following passage: 
Mr.  Biddle,  when  the  United  States  Bank  was 
appealed  to  during  the  money  scarcity  which 
followed  the "cotton panic"  C18251  and  the  banks' 
strengthening  of  their  position,  made  a  reply 
which  if  not  comforting  to  the  sufferers, 
certainly contained needed  truths: 
"It  is the  order  of nature,"  said  he,  "that if 
men  or  nations  live  extravagantly,  they  must 
suffer ti  11  they  repair  their losses  by  prudence, 
and  that  neither  man  nor  banks  should  impose  on 
the  community  by  promises  to pay  what  they  cannot 
pay.  The  laws  of trade have  their own  remedy  for 
such  disorders,  as  infallible  as  the  laws  of 
animal  life,  which  enables  the  human  system  to 
relieve  itself  from  its own  excesses.  Both  must have  their  course.  But  the  Bank  of the  United 
States  is invoked  to assume  that  which,  whoever 
attempts,  invokes  the  ruin he  will suffer.  It is 
requested  to  erect  itself  into  a  special 
providence  to modify  the  laws  of nature,  and  to 
declare  that  the  ordinary  fate  of  the  heedless 
and  improvident  shall  not  be  applied  to  the 
United States.  Our  countrymen  are  to be  indulged 
without  restraint  in the  utmost  extravagance  of 
the  luxuries of Europe,  on  credit from the  banks; 
and  when  the  day  of payment  arrives,  the  debtor 
shall  not  be  called  on  for  payment--the  banks 
shall  not  be. incommoded  to pay  their  own  notes, 
for  the  mome-nt  any  inconvenience  is  felt,  the 
Bank  of  the  United  States  will  certainly 
interpose  and  pay  the  debt.  But  if the  Bank  of 
the  United  States  blends  any  sense  with  its 
tenderness,  it  will  do nothing of a1 1 this."20 
While  this passage  might  not  illustrate completely  Mr.  Biddle's  understanding 
of the  "moral  hazard" problem,  faint glimmerings  of  such  awareness  are visible 
there,  nevertheless. 
IV.  Theory  Brought  Forward:  Open-Market  vs.  Discount Window  O~erations 
After  the  expiration  of  the  charter  of  the  Second  Bank  of the  United 
States  (18361,  there  was  no  central  bank  of  the  United  States  until  the 
Federal  Reserve  Act  was  enacted  in 1913.  At various  times,  the  subtreasuries 
and  the  New  York  Clearing  House  Association  performed  central  banking 
functions,  including,  in a  limited  way,  the  LLR  function.  The  reason  for 
their  limited LLR  function (liquidity  but  not  solvency  support)  was  the  same 
as  in the  preceding  di  scussion--excessive  advances  to insolvent  enti  ties,  on 
unsound  collateral,  could  precipitate  the  insolvency  of  the  LLR,  a  matter  of 
greater  moment  in the  gold-standard  era  than  today.  At one  point,  in 1895, 
J.P.  Morgan  and  August  Belmont  had  to act as  LLR  for the U.S.  Treasury  itself, pledging their own credit to borrow gold abroad  to restore the gold cover on 
the Treasury's obligations.  2  1 
The  framers of  the  Federal  Reserve  Act  originally  organized  the  System 
with authority to conduct both discount-window and open-market operations, but 
initially  there  were  comparatively  few  open-market  operations  as  we  would 
understand  them  today.  At the  discount  window, there  was  clear  intent that 
only  liauiditv,  but  not  solvency,  support  should  be  provided  because  of 
extensive  statutory  and  early  regulatory  requirements  governing  the 
eligibility of  collateral  for  discount  and  the  prohibition  of discounts or 
advances for long maturities.  No  paper could be  discounted with more than 90 
days'  remaining  maturity, except for  agricultural  paper,  and  that  paper  was 
limited to six months' maturity.  22 
The  Federal  Reserve  Banks  did  not  discover  the  efficacy  of open-market 
operations,  principally  in  bankers'  acceptances,  for  implementing  monetary 
policy  until  1922.  After  the  death  of  Benjamin  Strong,  first  Governor 
(President)  of the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New  York, the  System  lacked  a 
forceful  advocate  of  open-market  operations  at  the  time  of  the  Great 
Contraction (1929-1933). 2 3 
The difference between discount-window and  open-market operations  is  best 
illustrated  by  the  statutory and  physical  separations of  the  two functions. 
The  differences  are  badly  understood  outside  the  System,  and  that 
misunderstanding  probably  accounts for  much  of  the  terminological. confusion 
regarding the LLR--do you mean  the  discount window, the open-market desk, or 
both? 
Open-market operations  at-e performed  trnder  the  authority of Sections  12A 
and 14 of the Federal  Reserve Act.  The System's Open Market Trading Desk for domestic  operations  is located on  the eighth floor of the  Federal  Reserve  Bank 
of  New  York.  It  buys  and  sells and  enters  into repurchase  agreements  covering 
U.S.  government  and  certain government  agency  obl  igations  and,  prior to 1984, 
also dealt in  banker's  acceptances  for its  own  and  System  account. 
The  New  York  Fed's  discount  window  is located on  the  second  floor  of the 
same  building  and  has  an  entirely  separate  staff,  reporting  to a  separate 
chain  of management  command.  The  discount-window  operations  are  carried out 
under  Sections  10(b)  and  13  of the  Federal  Reserve  Act.  Any  sound  collateral, 
acceptable  to the  Reserve  Bank  from  credit  and  legal  standpoints,  may  be 
pledged  as  collateral  for  advances.  However,  since  the  1920s,  the  Federal 
Reserve  usually  has  discouraged  frequent  or  prolonged  use  of the  discount 
window  by  individual  institutions.  Special  emergency  lending  sections  were 
added  to Sections  10(a)  and  13  during 1932  and  1933,  but  they  were  used  only 
rarely  and  in small  amounts  then  and  generally  have  not  actually  been  used 
since  the  1930s. 24  Instead,  the  great  bulk  of the  solvencv  (or  capital) 
support  lending of the  1930s,  to  both banks  and  nonbanks  alike,  was  performed 
by  a  separate,  free-standing,  government-chartered  credit  agency,  the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC). 2  5 
The  RFC  had  the  explicit,  full-faith-and-credit backing  of the  U.S.  and 
was  authorized  to sell  its own  bonds  to raise  funds.  Congress  appropriated 
$500  million for  its initial  capital  in 1932.  In 1933,  the  RFC  was  given 
.  . 
authority to  purchase  nonvoting preferred stock of banks,  with maturities up  to 
10  years.26  Using  that authority,  together  with a  general  authority  to  make 
loans,  the  RFC  extended  $3  billion of solvency  (capital)  support  to the  U.S. 
banking  system,  including  loans  to conservators  and  receivers  of  distressed 
and  closed  banks.  The  Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation  (FDIC)  did not begin  operations  until 1934  and  did not provide  significant assistance  to the 
banking  system  during  the  1930s.  But  more  importantly,  for the  purposes  of 
this  paper,  the  Fed  also  did  not  provide  significant  assistance  to banks 
during the  1930s,  because it  did not have  to  do  so. 
The  RFC  was  abolished  during  the  1950s--it  had  become  an  indefensible 
political  boondoggle  after Jesse  Jones  was  removed  as  chairman  in early  1945 
and  was  bad  enough  under  Jones--and  some  of its functions  were  transferred to 
other  cabinet  departments.  For  example,  the  Export-Import  Bank  and  the  Small 
Business  Admini stration  originally  were  RFC  subsidiaries.  But  most 
importantly,  the  authority  to recapi  tal  ize  insolvent  banks  expired  with  the 
RFC--it  most  emphatically was  not transferred,  then or  later,  to  the Fed. 
Under  the  Garn-St  Germain  Act  of 1982,  the  FDIC  and  FSLIC  received  RFC  - 
like powers  to provide  solvency  (capital)  support  to poorly  capitalized  and 
insolvent  depository  institutions,  but  they  were  not expl  ici  tly authorized to 
borrow  from  the  Fed  to fund  such  operations.  Fed  forbearances  regarding 
advances  to depository  institutions  that  the  FDIC  assumes,  as  was  the  case 
with  the  advances  to Continental  Illinois  (1984)  and  Franklin  National  Bank 
(1974),  are unique:  the  Fed  never  made  such  prolonged  advances  in such  large 
amounts,  prior  to  the  Franklin  case. 27  However,  the  point  to  consider 
regarding  such  new  forms  of rescues  is  whether,  assuming  that the FDIC  now  has 
sufficient  financial  resources  to mount  such  efforts,  then  the  FDIC,  instead 
of the  Fed,  should  use  its RFC-like  powers  to assist  depository  institutions 
that require  solvency  or capital  support.  In other  words,  while  Fed  1i.feboat 
operations  might  work  (under  the  convenience  theory)  to  support  smaller 
institutions,  it is far  from  clear  that  (under-  the  necessity  theory)  large 
institutions,  especially those  with small  percentages  of insured deposits,  can or should be  saved  by  any  central  bank-led lifeboat operation or FDIC  solvency 
assistance.  Before  the  Continental  Illinois  rescue,  the  largest  completed 
1  ifeboat  operation  1 nvolved  First Pennsylvania  National  Bank,  which  had  about 
$9  billion of total assets  at the time  (1980). 28 
The  distinction that must  be  made  between  discount-window  and  open-market 
operations  in  LLR  theory  is  illustrated  by  the  Great  Contraction  of 
1929-1933.  The  generally .accepted  view  of Federal  Reserve  operations  during 
the Great  Contraction,  usually characterized as  a  failure of the LLR,  does  not 
distinguish  between  the  Fed's  discount-window  and  open-market  operations.  2 9 
The  sum  of  adjusted  bank  and  savings  institution  deposits,  together  with 
currency  outstanding,  shrank  from  $57.2  billion  (October  1929)  to  $40.8 
billion (March  19331,  reducing the effective money  stock,  an  ancestral  form of 
M-lA,  by  28.7  percent. 30  In the  face  of declining  public  demand  for  bank 
credit,  the most  generous  discount  window  (LLR)  in the  world  could  have  done 
1  i  ttle to  sustain  the  1929  money  stock  or price  level.  Indeed,  the  Federal 
Reserve  regularly reduced  the  discount  rate throughout  the Great  Contraction, 
from  6  percent  (New  York)  in October  1929  to 2.5  percent  (New  York)  in June 
1932.  The  discount  rate  was  increased  from  2.5  to 3.5  percent  on  March  3, 
1933,  the day  the bank  holiday was  proclaimed.  The  New  York  Fed's  buying rate 
for  prime  90-day  bankers'  acceptances  was  reduced  from  5.125  percent  in 
October  1929  to 0.25  to 0.375  percent  in  January  1933;  that  rate  then 
/ 
increased  to  1.125  to  3.375  percent during the March  1933  bank  holiday.  3  1 
Thus,  extremely  generous  discount-window  policies  did  not  avail--hardly 
anyone  wanted  to  borrow  money,  even  at discount  rates  as  low  as  2.5  percent  or 
acceptance  buying  rates  (proxy  for  open-market  rates)  as  low  as  0.25  percent. 
It was  not  possible  to push  on  the  monetary  string from  a  passive  discount window,  and  the  discount  window  usually  must  be  passive  to avoid  moral 
hazard.  Any  coordinated  and  sustained  policy  of open-market  purchases,  at 
almost  any  rate,  would  have  been  a  better  policy  and  might  have  turned  the 
monetary  col  lapse  around.  Yet,  such  purchases  would  have  constituted a pol  icy 
of  aggressively  supplying  bank  reserves  (liquiditv)  to the  market  in the 
aaareaate,  not solvency  or capital  support  to  particular institutions.  In any 
case,  it should  be  obvious  that  the  proper  strategy  for  the  Fed  to have 
pursued,  1929-1933,  would  have  been  aggressive  open-market  operations  to 
support  aeneral  liquidity and  to prevent  localized  liquidity  shortages  from 
causing  general  1  iqui  di  ty to implode.  Monetary  pol  icy should  not be  confused 
with  the  prudent  conduct  of  LLR  policy.  It is wrong  to say  that  the  Fed 
failed  as  LLR  in 1929-1  933,  referring  to di  scount-wi  ndow  operations,  but it 
would  be  correct  to say  that the  Fed  was  too cautious  an  operator  of an  open 
market  trading desk  then. 
The  following  anecdote  illustrates  both  the  moral  (or  philosophical)  and 
procedural  differences  between  a  properly  conducted  LLR  (discount  window)  and 
a  properly  conducted  monetary  policy  (open  market  operations):  In the  old 
days  of royal  coinage,  the royal mint had  two  choices  for expanding  the  local 
money  supply.  Option  one,  the  necessitv  theory,  would  have  required  the 
chancellor  of the  exchequer  to toss  the  prescribed  amount  of  new  gold  coins 
out  the  tower  window  periodically,  without  looking  to see  who  caught  the 
coins. *  The  aggregate  supply of  domestic  money  (1 i  quidi  ty) was  expanded, 
and  the  chancellor's  open-market  duty  was  performed  admirably.  In  the 
alternative,  the chancellor could have  offered  the gold at public auction 
to the highest bidder.  Thus,  those  with the greatest demand  for liquidity 
*I  am  indebted  to James  G.  Hoehn,  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Cleveland,  for this 
anal  ogy . would offer  the highest price and  would receive the greatest supply of 
liquidity.  This  story illustrates the essence  of  Currency  School-monetarist- 
rules-necessity theory,  as  applied to  the LLR:  a properly conducted 
open-market  operation  eliminates  the  need  for a  discount  window  LLR  because 
aggregate  1 i  qui  di  ty i  s  maintained.  Particular  firms  may  be  insolvent  and 
might  fai  1,  but  that is  of  no  concern  to the  chancel  lor,  as  long as  sufficient 
aggregate  1  iquidi  ty i  s  maintained. 
Now  let  us  consider  option  two,  the  convenience  theory,  the  discount 
window  (LLR)  version of  the  preceding anecdote.  Instead of tossing coins  out 
the  window  or  holding  an  auction,  the  chancel  lor descends  to the  courtyard, 
looks  over  the  crowd,  and  offers  bags  of  gold  to (select  one  among  these 
choices):  (a)  a  few  of  his  chosen  friends,  (b)  those  who  offer the  highest 
interest rate for the  gold,  or (c)  those  with greatest  demonstrable  need  for 
the  gold,  at either a  flat  rate or a  subsidy  rate.  The  only choice  that can 
be  reconciled with Bagehot's  supposedly  classic  theory  (discount  freely at a 
penalty  rate)  is (b),  but  the  Federal  Reserve  says  that  its normal  policy  is 
(c),  while outside observers allege that the policy' is (a). 32 
Without  comment  on  which  is the  correct  interpretation of current  pol  icy, 
it still should  be  clear  that an  opportunity  for abuse  of the  LLR  (discount 
window)  exists under  option two--the  chancellor  could  select option (a),  a  few 
of his friends,  and  not much  could be  done  about it if  he  were  not politically 
accountable  for his actions.  Moreover, if  the  principal  "friend"  under  option 
(a)  were  the  king  himself  (the  government  or  the  Treasury),  then  (a)  would 
seem  quite  a  likely  choice  in the  normal  coclrse  of  events.  In  such  a 
circumstance,  convenient  loans,  either  direct1  y  to the  government  or  to third 
parties  that  the  government  would  have  had  to  fund  if  the  LLR  did  not fund  them,  might  be  expected  to proliferate.  Once  the  monetary  authorities 
and  the  government  discover  such  convenience,  the  usual  distinctions  between 
advances  for  1  iquidi  ty  assi  stance,  on  the  security  of  sound  assets,  and 
advances  for  solvenc~  or  capital  support  might  become  blurred.  Recourse  to 
option  (b),  a  penalty rate,  would  become  impossible  because  such  a  rate would 
make  the marginally solvent newly  insolvent and  would  deepen  the  insolvency of 
those  already  insolvent.  Besides,  if the  government  became  a  borrower,  it 
would  be  difficult  to  charge  it  a  penalty  rate.  Thus,  the  superficial 
attraction of the discount  window  as  LLR  is deceptive--it is  easily abused  and 
plays very much  into the hands  of proponents of  Banking School- 
post-Keynesian--discretion-convenience theory. 
It is puzzling  that people  who  consider  themselves  adherents  of the  basic 
tenets  of  the  Currency  School  (monetari  sts)  sometimes  advocate  the  LLR 
methodology  of  the  Banking  School  (Keynesians),  but  that  probably  happens 
because  of insufficient attention to the  historical  development  of LLR  theory 
in the U.S.  and  the maintenance  of logically consistent  arguments  between  the 
two rival camps.  Mere  political expediency,  in  fact,  might have  nothing  to  do 
with it.  Nevertheless,  people  who  ordinarily  would  be  deeply  troubled  by 
advocacy  of having  the  central  bank  fund  the  Treasury's  deficits,  because  of 
the  monetary  imp1 i  cations  of  such  a  pol  icy  course,  often  are  surprisingly 
wi  11  ing  to have  the  central  bank  provide  solvency  or  capital  support  to 
insolvent  institutions  that either  would  have  to  be  allowed  to fail or would 
have  to be  funded  directly  by  the  Treasury  itself  in the  absence  of  such 
central bank  support. 
This  tendency  of some  monetarists  to approve  of an  activist  LLR  may  be 
attri  busted a1  so  to misreading Bagehot  (1  873)  and  Friedman  and  Schwartz  (1  963, at  391-4091.  While  Friedman  and  Schwartz  describe  clearly  how  some 
combi nation  of  Federal  Reserve  'di  scount-wi  ndow  advances  and  open-market 
purchases  of  securities  could  have  been  used  to counteract  the  monetary 
contraction  (1929-19331,  with  open-market  purchases  the  preferred  operating 
vehicle,  some  writers  who  normally  oppose  the  concept  of the  interventionist 
LLR  and  who  may  be  presumed  to  be  generally  sympathetic  with the objectives of 
this paper  have  written,  nevertheless,  that "the Fed ... did not have  the  same 
direct incentives as  the  clearinghouse  to  maintain  the  solvency  of the  banks, 
Candl  failed  to perform  as  we1 1  in dealing  with  the  bank  runs  from  1929 
through  1933  ...  ."  See,  e.g.,  Kaufman  (1988,  at 571);  Golembe  (1988,  at 
10).  Kane  (1988,  at  17-18)  offers the following insight into this problem: 
The  ability of  powerful  groups  to extract  government 
subsidies  may  be  deemed  to be  part and  parcel  of the 
American  system  of  free  enterprise.  .  .  .  A  .  .  . 
reasonable  goal  is merely  to make  the  production  of 
selective  subsidies  more  painful  to the  agents  who 
benefit  from their creation. 
Thus,  recognition  that  convenient  loans  to insure  the  solvency  of particular 
banks  constitute a public  subsidy  to those banks  is the beginning of wisdom on 
this  issue  and,  If  pol  icymakers  become  persuaded  by  Kane's  argument,  may 
contribute  to the  exaction  of greater  pain  in the  future  from  the  agents 
benefiting from the subsidy. 
Some  economists  have  noted  and  are  troubled  by  the  apparent  inconsistency 
between  official  statements  of devotion  to the  quantity  theory  of money,  on 
the one  hand,  and  reliance on  the discount  window  as  LLR,  on  the other hand. 
For  example,  Milton  Friedman  (1960,  at  30-511  84-86,  100)  in lectures 
delivered  in 1959,  recommended  that  the  Federal  Reserve's  power  to make  loans to  member  banks,  private  individuals,  corporations,  or  nonfederal  public 
bodies  be  repealed, precisely  because such  power was seen to be  inconsistent 
with  a  monetary  policy  that  depended  on  open-market  operations  and  with 
deregulation of banks' deposit-taking powers. 
In  particular,  Goodfriend  and  King  (1987)  accomplished  a  significant 
breakthrough  in  sorting  out  the  practical  consequences  of  pursuing  the  two 
opposing  theories  of the  LLR, described above  as  necessity  vs.  convenience. 
Their  principal  insight  is  that extensive reliance  on  a  discount  window  LLR 
creates  the  need  for  an  extensive  and  costly  system  of  supervisory  and 
regulatory compliance mechanisms to insure that the LLR is not abused.  On the 
other  hand,  they  argue, and  I  concur, a  purely  monetary (necessity)  policy 
creates  no real  need  for a  discount  window  LLR  at all  and  tends  to foster 
increasing  level  s  of financial  services  deregulation  because  no  monitoring 
system .is  necessary  to prevent  abuse of the  LLR.  Some  of Goodfriend's and 
King'  s conclusions  (my  adaptations) are as fol  lows: 
1 .  Monetary pol  icy  [open-market  operations  I  can a1  1  evi  ate banki  ng cri  ses 
by  increasing the money supply and smoothing nominal interest rates. 
2.  Banking pol  icy  [discount  window1 ordinarily Ci.e., in  small or modest 
amounts  1  i nf  1  uences  nei  ther  hi gh-powered  .  money  nor  the  aggregate 
supply and demand for goods. 
3.  "Central  bank  transfers  to  troubled  financial  institutions 
redistribute  wealth  between  different classes of citizens at best; 
inappropriate  incentives for ri sktaki  ng  and  1  iquidi  ty  management  may 
lead to more severe and frequent financial crises at worst."33 4.  "Banking  pol  icy  Cdi scount  window1  needs  costly  supporting  regulation 
and  supervision ... not to  be  abused." 
5.  "Monetary  policy  [open  market  operationsl  can  be  accomplished  in a 
manner  that  is1 anonymous ... ."  This  is analogous  to the  point made 
above  about  the  chancellor of the  exchequer  tossing the  coins out the 
tower  window  without  looking to  see  who  catches  them. 
6.  "Monetary  policy  [open  market  operationsl  ...  acts  on  economy-wide 
prices  and  interest  rates,  and  therefore  needs  no  supporting 
regulation and  supervision." 
"There  is  little  evidence  that  public  lending  to  particular 
institutions  is either  necessary  or  appropriate.  Even  if central 
bank  lending  served  a  useful  purpose  earlier in the  century,  today's 
credit markets  have  become  highly  efficient.  [I  am  more  skeptical 
th'an  Goodfriend  and  King  about  that  efficiency,  but  any  solvent 
borrower  should be  able to  obtain credit in today's  credit markets. I 
We  think  it  is  important  to begin  to ask  whether  central  bank 
lending,  either  through  the  discount  window  or  through  the  payments 
system,  is  still necessary." 
8.  "We  wonder  whether  the  Federal  Reserve's  potential  performance  as  a 
monetary  authori  ty Copen  market  operations I  would  not  be  enhanced  by 
shedding  of  its  central  banking  [discount  window  and  payments 
mechanism]  functions." On  this  latter  point,  it  is  worth  noti'ng  that  some  foreign  central  banks 
actively  support  price  levels  in  government  securities,  obligations  of 
government-sponsored  credit  intermediaries,  certain  commodities,  and  even,  in 
Japan in  the  1960s, the local  stock market.  But even if  thev do such things, 
that  does  not  necessarily  mean  that we  should  imitate  their  example.  When 
LLR  policy  allows  direct  support of  the  price  level  on the  stock  exchange, 
option  two  (a)  in  the  chancellor  of  the  exchequer  anecdote (loans  to a few 
chosen friends)  becomes more  likely  than not.  Therefore, if  Goodfriend's  and 
King's  conclusions are correct, and  I  be1  ieve that they generally are correct, 
then a wholesale rethinking of  U.S.  LLR  theory is necessary. 
V.  Conclusion 
A principally American,  as distinguished from European,  theory of the LLR 
has evolved  in  the United States, starting from the same origin as in  England, 
the writings of Adam Smith.  In  the U.S.,  spurred  by  the concerns of  Madison 
and Jefferson  regarding too great  a  convenience  in  central-bank  loans  to the 
Treasury  or to individual  corporations,  a  view of  the  LLR  emerged  that  was 
para1  lel  to  the thinking of the Currency School at the Bank of  England.  After 
1890, the U.K.  pursued  actively  an  interventioni  st  LLR  pol  icy,  preferring  to 
mount  lifeboat  operations  to  save  arguably  insolvent  banks  and  merchant 
banks.  U.S.  policy usually did  not follow that lead  of the U.K.  but remained 
within  the  broad  outlines of a  necessity  theory  of the  LLR  until  the  large 
failing-bank  rescues  of  the  1970s.  Friedman  and  Schwartz  (1963)  taught  us 
that  it  is  possible  for  the  central  bank  to  offer  extremely  attractive 
di  scount-window rates without  stopping  a  1 iquidi  ty  implosion--only  aggressive open-market  purchases,  at any  specified rate,  can  accomplish  that  objective. 
 he  new  large-bank  rescues  (1970s  and  1980~1,  with even  more  ominous  portents 
of LLR  rescues  of governmental  agencies,  miss  the  point of  RFC  operations  in 
the  1930s--only  the  government  itself,  which  is politically accountable,  not 
the  central  bank,  which  is not  so  clearly  politically  accountable,  should 
mount  solvencv  or  capital  support  operations  for  particular  institutions  or 
agencies,  as  long  as  the  central  bank's  open-market  operations  provide 
necessary  aggregate  1  iauidi't~  to the  markets.  The  American  LLR  should  not 
attempt  lifeboat,  solvency,  or capital-support operations  to maintain targeted 
price  levels  in particular  markets,  no  matter  what  the  central  banks  in 
European  and  other  foreign countries  do--that  is a matter  of convenience  for 
them,  not  necessitv,  and  the  American  LLR  is or  ought  to be  governed  by  a 
necessi tv  standard.  Besides,  no  one  accuses  the  Fed's  open-market  trading 
desk  of supplying  insufficient  aggregate  liquidity  lately.  Before  expanding 
the  Federal  Reserve's  LLR  operations,  policymakers  should  pause  to consider 
the message  of Goodfriend  and  King  (1987):  understand  where  a  consistent  and 
coherent  theory  of central  banking  lies,  and  then  move  policy ahead.  To  do 
otherwise  is to opt  for the  convenience  theory  of the  LLR,  not  the  necessity 
theory . 
Milton  Friedman,  writing in a  1985  symposium  on  the  Keynesian  heritage, 
quoted  a  letter  that  Keynes  wrote  to Friedrich  von  Hayek  in 1944,  on  the 
occasion  of the publication of Hayek's  Road  to Serfdom.  While  Keynes  wrote  of 
his misgivings  about  central  planning,  I  believe  that  the  same  remarks  apply 
with at least equal  vigor  to the advocacy  of convenience  or discretion in  U.S. 
LLR  theory: Moderate  planning  wi  11  be  safe  if those  carrying 
it out  are  rightly  oriented  in their  own  minds 
and  hearts  to the  moral  issue.  This  is in fact 
already  true  of some  of  them.  But  the  curse  is 
that  there  is  an  important  section  who  could 
almost  be  said to  want  planning not in  order  to 
enjoy  its fruits  but  because  morally  they  hold 
ideas  exactly  the  opposite  of  yours  Cd. 
Hayek'sl  and  wish  to  serve  not  God  but  the 
devil.  Reading  the  New  Statesman  &  Nation  one 
sometimes  feels that those  who  write there,  while 
they  cannot  safely  oppose  moderate  planning,  are 
really  hoping  in their  hearts  that it will not 
succeed;  and  so  prejudice  more  violent  action. 
They  fear  that  if  moderate  measures  are 
sufficiently  successful,  thi  s  wi  11  a1 low  a 
reaction  in what  you  think  the  right  and  they 
think  the  wrong  moral  direction.  Perhaps I  do 
them  an  injustice;  but perhaps I  do  not.34 
In the Appendixes  to this paper,  there  are  three excerpts  on  the evolution 
of the  American  theory  of the  LLR  in the  twentieth  century.  They  are  all in 
the  spirit of the  following remarks  of Michele  Fratianni,  delivered  in a  1983 
semi nar : 
[It  is1 a  fundamental  error  ...  [to  fail1 to 
distinguish  between  insolvency  and  i  11 iquidi  ty. 
This  has  been  a  great  theme  in  this  ... 
[conference]:  the  separation  of  the  problems  of 
the  individual  bank  from  the  problem  of  the 
system as  a whole. 
I  do  not  want  to repeat  this  argument  except  to 
refer  to Anna  Schwartz's  excellent  presentation 
and  make  the  additional  point  that  bankers  know 
the  distinction  very  well.  They  do  not  care  to 
make  it, for it pays  not  to.  It is not  that  we 
do  'not  teach  the principle in the  schools;  it is 
not  that it is not  well  understood,  but  that it 
i  s  convenient  for  individual  bankers  to  treat 
insolvency,  which  is  a  micro  problem,  as  a 
systemic  problem.  Perhaps  if  we  were  to  find 
ourselves  in  the  same  position,  we  would  be 
induced  to do  the  same  thing.35 Footnotes 
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bank,  have  forced  the  moral  hazard  issue  into the  background  and  have 
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undertaken,  the  events  were  pseudo-financial  crises. 
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Excerpts  from an  April 25.  1988  Aruument 
by  Walker  F.  Todd 
On  Federal  Reserve  assistance to  deposit insurance  auencies 
and  the theorv of central bank  assistance aenerallv. Federal  Reserve  assistance  to (deposit i  nsurance  aaenci es)  and  the  theorv  of 
central bank  assi  stance  aenerall  v. 
A  major  conceptual  issue  arises  in  connection  with  any  hypothetical 
request  for  Federal  Reserve  assistance  to  the  deposit  insurance  funds. 
Covering  the  funds'  own  obligations  might  be  proposed  to include  Reserve 
Banks '  forbearances  with respect  to their advances  to  depository  institutions 
that  the  deposit  insuror 'later  assumes,  or  the  obligations  of insured  banks 
that the  insuror  either  cannot  cover,  or does  not  wish  to cover,  in whole  or 
in  part. 
It has  been  the  long-settled  tradition  of central  banks  in the  United 
States  (First and  Second  Banks  of the United States  and  Federal  Reserve  Banks) 
that,  in their  lending  function,  they  provide  necessary  liquidity  (but  not 
capital  or  solvency)  support,  on  the  security of  sound  assets.  In the  gold- 
standard  era,  the  central  bank  had  to observe  this rule because  advances  in 
excess  of its' specie  or bull  ion cover  might  cause  the  11  1  iquidi  ty (suspension 
of  redemption  in  specie)  of  the  central  bank's  circulating  notes  (paper 
currency).  If the central  bank  were  so  imprudent  as  to  advance  funds  without 
security,  or on  bad  security,  the  central  bank  itself  could  become  insolvent 
and  face  liquidation if its borrowers became  insolvent and  failed to  repay  the 
central bank.  The  Federal  Reserve  Act,  which  was  enacted  in the gold  standard 
era,  provides  explicitly for the  liquidation of  the Reserve  Banks,  among  other 
things,  to cover  such  situations.  See  12  U.S.C.  section  248  (h)  (Section  11 
* 
(h)). 
The  traditional  and  statutory  remedy  for  a  central  bank's  i  11  iquidi  ty was 
suspension  of  the  central  bank's  statutory  authority  to pay  out  specie  or bullion in exchange  for its own  or the  Treasury's  notes.  Such  suspension  had 
to be  authorized by  statute,  by  executive  order,  or,  in the national  bank  era, 
by  order of the Secretary of the Treasury  or the Comptroller of the Currency. 
The  remedy  for  a  central  bank's  insolvencv  during  the  gold-standard  era 
had  to be  even  more  drastic.  For  one  thing,  the  central  bank's  insolvency 
might  force  the  Treasury  into the  hard  choice  among  a  pub1  ic debt  issue  (to 
raise  gold  and  Treasury  securities  with  which  to restore  the  central  bank's 
gold cover  and  backing  for the note  issue),  a tax  increase  to  recapitalize the 
central  bank,  or  the  liquidation  of  the  central  bank  (which  might  entail 
paying off its  obligations at less than par). 
If  the  Federal  Reserve  Banks  attempted  to  fund  an  insolvent  deposit 
insuror,  then  the  current fair value of the Reserve  Banks'  assets  would become 
substantially  less  than  the  value  of  their  liabilities if  the  insuror's 
obligations  were  discounted  at  par,  but  the  value  of  the  insuror's 
rehypothecated  assets  were  substantially  less  than  par.  A1  so,  the  qua1 i  ty of 
the  Reserve  Banks'  assets  would  diminish  anyway  if  holdings  of 
full-fai  th-and-credi t  obl  igations  of  the  Treasury  were  1  iquidated  and  were 
replaced  by  claims  on  insurors  known,  or widely  suspected,  to be  insolvent. 
The  .technical,  legal  backing  for  the  Federal  Reserve  note  issue  (currency) 
would  be  weakened  correspondingly.  Central  banks  in developing  countries 
already are  loaded  up  with nonperforming,  government-guaranteed  assets.  There 
is  no  good  reason  for the Federal  Reserve  to imitate their example. 
But  even  more  fundamental  reasons  for not  attempting  to have  the  Re.serve 
Banks  postpone  a deposit  insuror's  insolvency  include the following: It is simple,  textbook  political  economy  that  the  central 
bank  should  not  subordinate  its credit  decisions  to the 
Treasury's  need  to finance  its deficits  because  to do  so 
weakens  fiscal  discipline  and  inexorably  ushers  in a  new 
era  of inflation.  The  same  principle  applies  to central 
bank  funding of the  Treasury's  indirect deficits;  that  is, 
the  payment  of  obligations  of  government  agencies  or 
instrumentalities  that  the  Treasury  would  have  to finance 
elsewhere,  if the  central  bank  were  not  induced  to do  so. 
It is misleading  to think  of the  financing  of a  deposit 
insuror's  or any  other  government  agency's  debts  as  either 
ordinary  or  extraordinary  assistance  that  a  central  bank 
must  provide,  of necessitv.  It would  be,  to be  sure, 
very  convenient  to governmental  officials who  would  prefer 
to  defer  confronting  their  responsi  bi  1  i  ty  either  to 
recapitalize  or  to  liquidate  the  govertiment  -sponsored 
credit  agencies,  to  have  the  central  bank  fund  them 
instead.  A1 so,  because  the  central  bank's  assi  stance 
necessarily  spares  political  figures  from  making  hard 
choices  in  these  cases,  the  discipline  of  political 
accountability  is lost.  One  just cannot  think of  a deposit 
insuror or any  other government  agency  in the  same  way  that 
one  thinks  of a  commercial  bank,  or  even  an  independent 
commercial  enterprise.  that  requests  central  bank 
assi  stance  in  comparable  ci  \-cumstances  .  The  deposi t insurors  and  government  agencies  have  no  special  claim on 
central  bank  funding,  and  almost  always  should  be  denied 
such  fundi  ng,  preci  sely  because  of their  governmental  or 
quasi-governmental  status. 
Beyond  being bad  fiscal policy,  it  might be  bad  law for the 
Federal  Reserve  to fund  the  government  or  its agencies, 
other  than  by  the  provision  of  central  bank  credit  for 
government  obligations  in  the  open  market,  on  a 
one-for-one,  market-value  basis.  The  Federal  Reserve  Act 
provides  explicitly  that  Reserve  Banks  may  purchase  the 
Treasury's  obligations  only  in  the  open  market,  not 
directly  from  the  Treasury.  See  12  U.S.C.  section  355 
(Section  14  (b)  (2)).  More  to the  point,  it was  Federal 
Reserve  System  policy  for nearly  50  years  that  the  Thomas 
Amendment  to the  Agricultural  Adjustment  Act  of 1933,  the 
source  of the former,  1  imi  ted ($3  bi  11  ion)  authority of  the 
Reserve  Banks  to lend  currency  directly  to the  Treasury, 
should be  repealed--in 1981,  the  last vestige of the Thomas 
Amendment  was  allowed  to expire  under  a  sunset  statute. 
See  former  Section  14  (h);  1983  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin 
426.  Cf.  Raymond  Moley,  After Seven  Years  158-161  (19391.- 
Since  1981,  there  has  been  no  statutory  authority  for the 
Reserve  Banks  to lend  either  their  own  or  the  Treasury's 
obl  igations  directly  to the  Tr-easury.  & former  Sections 
14  (b)  (3)  and  14  (h).  With the anachronistic exception of the  Federal  ~ntermediate  Credit  Banks,  under  an 
authorization  that has  been  part of the Federal  Reserve  Act 
since  1923  but  apparently  never  has  been  used,  there  is no 
current  statutory  authority  for  the  Reserve  Banks  to lend 
directly  to or  for  the  account  of any  federal  agency  or 
instrumentality.  See  12  U.S.C.  sections  349,  350  (Sections 
13a  (21, (3)). 
A1 exander  Hami 1  ton once  wrote  that one  of  the  conveniences 
(not  necessities)  of a  central  bank  was  that  the  Treasury 
could  obtain  loans  from it in time  of need.  However,  it 
should  be  noted  that  Hamilton  was  writing  under  the 
constraints  of  the  gold-standard  era,  that  he  would  not 
have  advocated  loans  that ml  ght  imperi  1  the  central  bank's 
solvency,  and  that his successors  in  office eventually came 
to understand  the  evils  of  central  bank  funding  of  the 
Treasury's  accounts. 
3.  Lending  to the  Treasury  indirectly,  by  lending to  a deposit 
insuror  or  a  government  agency  under  one  of the  emergency 
lending  statutes,  such  as  Sections  13(3)  and  13  (13)  of  the 
Federal  Reserve  Act,  also  distorts  the  intent  of  those 
statutes,  which  are  aimed  at individuals,  partnerships,  and 
corporations.  Those  statutes  always  have  been  interpreted 
in the  past  as  requiring  the  borrower  to demonstrate  that 
it could  not  obta'in  adequate  amounts  of credit  el  sewhere, "from  other  banking  institutions."  (Section  13t3)).  It 
would  be  a  circumvention  of  that  statute  for  a  deposit 
insuror  or  government  agency  to  obtain  credit  from  a 
commercial  bank,  which  in  turn rediscounted  that borrower's 
note  with  a  Reserve  Bank.  Section  13  (13)  authorizes 
advances  to individuals,  partnerships,  and  corporations  on 
the  security of "direct obligations of the United States  or 
.  . .  any  agency  of the United States ." If anyone  holds  such 
obligations  today,  it should  be  able  to obtain  adequate 
amounts  of credit from  commercial  banks.  Also,  presumably, 
if a  deposit  insuror  or  government  agency  held  acceptable 
collateral,  of any  type,  it probably  could  obtain  credit 
from commercial  banks.  Without  acceptable  collateral,  why 
-should  either  Reserve  Banks  or  commercial  banks  lend  to 
such  a borrower? 
But,  for the  reasons  indicated above,  the Reserve  Banks  should  not extend 
new  credit  to  or for the  account  of  a  deposit  insuror or government  agency, 
even  with acceptable collateral, even  valued fairly at current market prices. 
For  example,  the  statutes  governing  FSLIC  and  the  FDIC  clearly  contemplated 
that  they  depend  on  Congressional  appropriations,  once  their normal - resources 
were  exhausted.  The  statutory  lines of  Treasury  credit are  $750  million for 
FSLIC  and  $3  billion for the FDIC. 
The  deposit  insurors  and  some  governmet~t agencies  may  be  "corporations," 
as  a  matter  of  legal  form,  but  they  also are  federally  owned  or  controlled corporations,  and,  like it or not,  that makes  them  different.  So  different, 
in fact,  that  the  Reserve  Banks  should  not  lend  to them  without  explicit 
congressional  authorization.  Otherwi  se,  the  lessons  of  the  principles 
discussed  above  would  be  rendered  meaningless.  See  Moley  at 158-161  if this 
point still is insufficiently clear. 
Until  the  last  10  years  or  so,  Federal  Reserve,  Treasury,  and 
congressional  officials generally  understood  the principles  described here  and 
did  not  violate  them.  The  greatest  exception  to the  principle  that  the 
central  bank  should  not  fund  a  government  agency  was  at the  creation of the 
FDIC,  in 1933,  when  one-half  of  the  cumulative  surplus  of  the  Reserve  Banks, 
about  $139  mi  11  ion,  was  appropriated  to fund  the  FDIC.  But  that measure  was 
enacted  by  Congress  specificially  for  that  purpose,  and  the  great  financial 
rescue  agency,  the Reconstruction  Finance  Corporation  (RFC),  was  prohibited by 
the  terms  of its own  authorizing  statute  from  funding  itself with  Reserve 
Banks  credi t.  Decades  later,  when  the  Frank1  in National  Bank  fai  1  ed  (1  9741, 
the Federal  Reserve  forbore  collection of the  loan  outstanding at the  closing 
($1.7  billion)  for up  to 3  years  to enable  the  FDIC  to  conduct  an  orderly 
liquidation.  But  the Reserve  Bank  did not increase  the amount  of the Franklin 
advance,  other  than  incidentally,  after  the  closing  was  decided  upon 
(September  1974)  and  made  no  new  advances  to the  FDIC  after  the  closing 
(October  1974).  Similarly,  when  Continental  Illinois  was  rescued  in 1984, 
part of the  Federal  Reserve's  advance  outstanding  on  the  rescue  date  (up  to 
$3.5  bi  11  ion)  was  forborne for  up  to five  years,  again  to enable  the  FDIC  to 
conduct  an  orderly  liquidation  of   continental"^  bad  assets.  Again,  no  new 
advances  were  made  to the  liquidating bank  after  the  rescue  date,  and  the  FDIC 
has  not  yet  formally  requested  a  renewal  or  extension  of  the  original, 
five-year forbearance,  which  expires  in  September  1989. Thus,  there  is neither  a  legal  tradition nor  sufficient precedent  for the 
Reserve  Banks  to  become  a funding mechanism  for any  deposit insuror or federal 
agency  or  instrumentality,  except  with  a  full Treasury  guarantee  and  on  a 
fully reimbursable  basis,  pursuant  to  an  explicit act of  Congress. 
The  proper  way  for the Reserve  banks  to  behave  in  a financial  crisis is to 
guarantee  sufficient  aggregate  liquidity  to  the  banking  system,  through 
open-market  operations.  Letting it be  known  in Washington,  D.C.,  that  the 
Reserve  Banks  are  available  to fund  insolvent  operations  that the  Treasury  is 
reluctant  to fund  risks  becoming  a  dead-certain  formula,  a  self-fulfilling 
prophecy,  for eventual  fiscal and  monetary  disaster. Appendi  x B 
Excer~ts  from an April 17, 1987 letter 
by  Walker F.  Todd 
On the requirement that the Treasurv secure its deposits 
and on the Treasury's  incapacity to  create monev The  CU.S.1  Treasury  .  .  .  is required,  by  statute,  by  common  sense,  and  by 
traditional United States  economic  theory,  to insure  that its  account  balances 
held  in the  commercial  banking  system  are  secured  by  adequate  pledges  of 
collateral.  31  U.S.C.  Sections  323,  3122  (1983).  B. receipt of tax  monies 
under  26  U.S.C.  Sections  5703  (c)  and  6302.  Under  Section  323,  there  is no 
apparent  authority for the  Secretary  of the  Treasury  to waive  the  "secured by 
pledged  collateral" requirement  for  deposits  of the  Treasury's  operating cash 
in  the commercial  banking  system.  The  origins of the TT&L  collateral require- 
ment  are  found  in the  subtreasury  system  that  was  implemented  in 1846.  The 
Treasury  discovered  that state banks  occasionally failed,  causing  some  loss of 
the  Treasury's  deposits.  To  prevent  such  loss,  an  1846  law  required  the 
Treasury  to keep  its funds  only  in the  subtreasuries.  See  Davis  R.  Dewey, 
Financial  History  of  the  United  States  253  (1903).  Despite  the  law,  the 
Treasury  did act from  time  to  time  to stem banking panics by  placing its funds 
in  the banks.  Charles P.  Kindleberger,  Manias.  Panics and Crashes  168  (1978). 
The  fiscal  agency  functions  of  the  subtreasuries  were  assumed  by  the  Federal 
Reserve  Banks  under  the  Federal  Reserve  Act  of 1913,  including the  acceptance 
of the  Treasury's  deposits.  However,  the  Treasury  did not begin  to transfer 
its funds  from  the  subtreasuries  to the Reserve  Banks  until 1916,  and  it was 
not until 1921  that the last subtreasury was  closed.  Paul  Studenski  and  Herman 
Krooss,  Financial  Historv  of  the  United  States  261  (1952).  In 1917,  the 
Treasury  was  authorized to  place  bond  proceeds  in  banks  (Section  312-2)  and,  in 
1977,  Section  323  was  amended  to  authorize  the  Treasury  to  deposit  its 
operating  cash  in commerci a1  banks.  As  Ki  ndl  eberger  observes,  (at  168),  "The 
Treasury  could  absorb  money  in deposits  and  pay  out  surpluses  from  existing 
funds,  but  apart  from  the  greenback  period  C1862-18781  it could  not  create money."  Thus,  it makes  good  sense  for  the  Treasury's  funds  on  deposit  in 
commercial  banks  to be  secured  by  pledges  of banks'  assets  at the  Reserve 
Banks  because,  to  obtain replacement  funds,  the  Treasury  would  have  to issue 
new  Treasury  debt. Appendix C 
Excerpts from an October 22.  1986 araument 
by  Walker F.  Todd The  most  intriguing,  and  most  explicit,  statement  by  the  Federal  Reserve 
System '  regarding  the  proper  role  of  central  banks  with  respect  to 
solvency/capital  support  of other  entities  is in a  report on  a  conference  of 
South  American  central  banks  that  appears  at 1932  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin 
43.  Advisors  to the  conference,  representing  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of New 
York,  were  Professor  E.  W.  Kemmerer,  Princeton  University;  assistant  deputy 
governor  (later  Allan  Sproul;  and  Eric  F.  Lamb,  foreign 
department.  The  views  of  those  gentlemen  clearly  were  reflected  in the 
conference  report,  from which relevant excerpts follow: 
It  is  necessary,  therefore,  to  state 
emphatically once  more  that the  central  banks 
were  not  created  as  a  substitute  for 
commercial  banks  and  cannot  be  regarded  as  a 
source  of panaceas  for  economic  i  11s  which 
are  subject  to a  slow  and  painful  process  of 
recovery.. .  .  Central  banks  must  not  in any 
way  supply  capital  on  a  permanent  basis 
either  to member  banks  or  to  the  pub1  ic, 
which  may  lack  it for  the  conduct  of their 
business. 
In cases  where  the  central  banks,  by  reason 
of their constitution,  have  to incorporate in 
their  assets  long-term  investments  of  slow 
realization,  it is advisable  to separate  the 
total  of  such  accounts  from  their  other 
assets  and  place  it  with  any  other 
organization  or  bank,  the  purpose  and 
functions  of which  are  compatible  with  such 
investments. 
Considering  that the  investments  of a  central 
bank  must  be  maintained  at all times  wholly 
in a  state of  1  iquidi  ty and  that,  therefore, 
the  provision  of  permanent  capital  or 
long-term  credits  is entirely opposed  to its 
purposes,  the  conference  would  recommend  that 
new  credits  should  not  be  extended  to those 
commercial  banks  which,  during an  agreed-upon 
period of time,  have  continuously made  use  of 
the rediscount privilege at the central bank. . .  . 
In  cases  of  urgent  necessity  it  is 
recommended  that  requests  for  credit  on  the 
part of a member  bank  which  has  not  been  out 
of debt  during  the  previous  calendar  year  be 
attended  to in  any  event  after the  soliciting 
bank  has  agreed  to submit  to an  inspection by 
the  central  bank,  for  the  purpose  of 
establishing  beforehand  its  solvency  and 
liquidity,  the  examination  to show  that  the 
member  bank' s  operations  are  conducted  wi  th 
its own  resources  and  to establish the  urgent 
need  for assistance. 
Obviously  there must  always  be  for the common 
good  perfect  harmony  between  the  fiscal 
policy  and  banking  policy.  There  should  be 
clearly  establ i  shed  within  this  concept  the 
necessi ty  for  absol  ute  i  ndependence  of  the 
central  banks  from  any  intervention  by 
partisan  politics  and  from  any  influence  on 
the  part  of  the  government  or  of  its 
officials  beyond  the  scope  of  their  usual 
powers. 
... 
The  conference  would  recommend  particularly 
that  for  the  efficient  discharge  of  these 
functions  [control  and  inspection,  or  bank 
examination],  those  intrusted  with  their 
performance  should,  in all cases,  insist  on 
the  strict  application  of the  law,  free  of 
any  outside  influence  whatever  which  might 
cause  them  to  swerve  from  their  proper 
mission. 
Every  central  bank  should  always  be 
administered  first for  the  public  interest, 
with  the  payment  of  dividends  a  seccndary  - 
consideration. 
Comparable  themes  reappeared  in Federal  Reserve  literature  nearly  40 
years  later,  in two  places.  In Re~ort  of  a System  Committee,  1  Reappraisal 
of  the  Federal  Reserve  Discount  Mechanism  3,  at 19  (19721,  the  following 
statement  appears: This  responsibility  Can  effective role  as 
"lender  of last resort,"]  is not  construed 
as  placing  the  Federal  Reserve  in  the 
position  of  maintaining  the  financial 
structure  in statu quo.  The  System  should 
not  act  to prevent  losses  and  impairment 
of  capital  of  particular  financial 
institutions.  If  pressures  develop 
against  and  impair  the  profitability  of 
institutions  whose  operations  have  become 
unstable,  inappropriate  to  changing 
economi c  condi  tions  ,  or  competitively 
disadvantaged  in  the  marketplace,  it  is 
not  the  Federal  Reserve's  respmsibility 
to  use  its  broad  monetary  powers  in  a 
bail-out operation. 
In a  separate  essay  in the  same  collection,  by  Bernard  Shull,  Board  of 
Governors  staff,  Report  on  Research  Undertaken  in Connection  With  a  System 
Study,  1 Reapprai sal  31 , at 41 , the fol  lowing ci  tation appears,  taken  from a 
1954  System  committee  study of the discount mechanism: 
A  major  lesson  brought  out by  the bank  credit 
liquidation  (in  the  early  1920's)  ...  was 
that  it was  unsound  for  any  member  bank  to 
use  continuous  indebtedness  to i  ts  Reserve 
Bank  as  a  resource  for  conducting  regular 
banking operations  ....  In  the severe banking 
crisis and  liquidation in the  early Thirties, 
adjustment  problems  of  the  aggressive, 
conti  nuous  borrowi  ng  banks  made  evident  the 
hazards  to safety  of deposit  funds  [because 
assets  that might  have  been  sold or delivered 
to  satisfy  claims  of  current  depositors 
already  had  been  pledged  to Reserve  Banks  to 
obtain  funds  that  already  were  spent  to 
sati  sfy  claims  previously  presented  by creditors]. .  . .  Because  of  thi  s  costly 
lesson,  it was  possible  by  the  mid-Thirties 
to speak  of an  established  tradition  against 
member  bank  reliance on  the  discount  facility 
as  a  supplement  to its resources....  Future 
discount  policy  ..  .  should  build  on  the 
tradition as  a kevstone. 
Then,  in Hackley's  1973  treatise,  the  following  statement 
appears  at 194: 
Still  another  reason  for  the  policy  [against  continuous 
borrowings  by  member  banks  from  the  Reserve  Banks1  is that 
extended  borrowings  by  a  member  bank  from  its Reserve  Bank 
would  in effect constitute  a  use  of Federal  Reserve  credit 
as  a  substitute  for  the  member  bank's  capital.  Thus,  the 
1973  revision  of  Regulation  A  states,  as  a  general 
principle,  that "Federal  Reserve  credit is  not  a  substitute 
for  capital  and  ordinarily  is not  available  for  extended 
periods." 
Room  is left within that  statement  of principle for extended  credit  in 
emergency  situations,  interpreted in recent years  within the  Federal  Reserve 
System  as  allowing  extended  advances  to  an  insolvent  institution  to 
facilitate an  orderly closing or merger,  when  such  orderlv closing or merqer is  in view,  but  the  statement  of principle clearly does  not contemplate  the 
substitution  of  Federal  Reserve  credi t  for  a  borrower ' s  capi  tal  .  That 
statement  of principle  is continued  in the  1980  revision  of Regulation  A 
(the current version)  at 12  C.F.R.  section 201.5(a)  ("Federal  Reserve  credit 
is not  a  substitute  for capital").  This  view  of the  System's  role in not 
providing  solvency/capital  support  to  others  is the  traditional  view  of the 
proper  role  of  central  banks  in  the  United  States,  .  regardless  of how 
frequently  and  how  extensively  foreign  central  banks  have  performed  the 
solvency/capi  tal  support  role  in their  economies,  and  regardless  of how 
frequently  academic  1 i  terature  or  pol i  ti  clans  urge  the  Reserve  Banks  to 
expand  the  operations  of the  di  scount  window  to include  a  sol  vencylcapi  tal 
support  component.  The  burden  of proving the need  and  author1  ty for a  shift 
of  the  Reserve  Banks  away  from  their  traditional  role  regarding 
solvencylcapital  support  should  be  borne  by  the  advocates  of  such  a  shift, 
not  by  those  of us  who  believe  that  the  status  quo  represents  a  reasonably 
accurate  distillation  of  all  the  wisdom  of  the  past  regarding  central 
banking in  the United States. 
o  In January  1932,  in the  throes  of the  Great  Depression  and  at the 
outset  of an  election year,  the  Hoover  Administration  created  the 
Reconstruction  Finance  Corporation  (RFC) ,  a  repri  se  of  the  Mar 
Finance  Corporation  of  1918,  with  expanded  powers.  The  RFC,  a 
separately  chartered,  separately  financed  government  agency,  was 
authorized  to lend  to banks  and  other  enterprises  for terms  of  up 
to three  years,  with renewals  pertnitted  for  up  to five  years  from 
the  date  of the  first loan,  against  "full and  adequate  security." Later,  the RFC  Act was  amended  to authorize renewals  of loans  unti  1 
10  years  from  the  date  of origination.  The  RFC  also  could  make 
1  imi  ted amounts  of loans  to  receivers of banks  that were  closed or 
in the  process  of  1  iquidation.  Bank  conservators  did  not  yet 
exist.  No  power  to lend  to liquidators  then  was  given  to Reserve 
Banks.  Carter Glass  still was  very  much  alive and  by  then  was  very 
much  involved  in Senate  banking  legislation.  Carter  Glass  was  a 
scholar  of  Shakespeare,  Burke,  and  Jefferson,  and  considered 
himself  the  heir and  standard-bearer  of the  Virginia traditions of 
governmental  theory.  Glass  was  the  twentieth-century United States 
Senator  whose  views  most  closely  para1  1  el  ed  those  of  Thomas 
Jefferson himself.  Glass  would  not,  as  long as  it was  within his 
power  to  prevent it, have  allowed his creations,  the Reserve  Banks, 
to become  involved  in  a  politicized undertaking,  such  as  the  loans 
the  RFC  was  authorized  to make,  for  the  benefit  of  the  Hoover 
Administration.  1932  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin 94,  95-96,  for 
the  text  of  relevant  portions  of  the  RFC  Act.  As  further 
protection from having  the  Reserve  Banks  finance  the  operations  of 
the RFC  itself,  Section  9  of  the  RFC  Act  provided  explicitly  that 
obligations  of  the  RFC  "shall  not  be  eligible  for  discount  or 
purchase  by  any  Federal  Reserve  Bank."  1932  Federal  Reserve 
Bulletin at 97.  As  is  noted  below,  the  principle that the  Reserve 
Banks  should  not provide  solvencylcapi  tal support  to other  enti  ties 
was  breached  only  once  by  Congress,  when  the  Federal  Deposit 
Insurance Corporation  (FDIC)  Act (former  Section  12B of the  Federal 
Reserve  Act)  was  enacted  as  part  of  the  Banking  Act  of 1933.  At that  time,  the  Reserve  Banks  were  required  to  subscribe  for 
approximately  48%  of the  capital  of the  new  FDIC.  Also,  as  Jesse 
Jones,  former  chairman  of the  RFC,  expressed  it,  in 1932,  "Few 
members  of  Congress  probably  thought  that  the  government  could 
afford to put  its credit behind  our  whole  economy,  which  we  later 
did  under  Roosevelt."  Jesse  H.  Jones,  with  Edward  Angly,  Fifty 
Billion Dollars:  My  Thirteen Years  With  the RFC  (1932-19451,  at 84 
o  Section  10(b> was  added  to the  Federal  Reserve  Act on  February 27, 
1932.  It authorized  advances  to member  banks  on  the  security  of 
any  satisfactory  assets,  in exceptional  and  exigent  circumstances. 
It  did not authorize  solvency/capital  support  or loans  to  receivers 
of closed banks. 
o  ~ect'ion 13(3)  was  added  to the  Federal  Reserve  Act  on  July  21, 
1932.  It authorized  discounts  for individuals,  partnerships,  and 
corporations  in  unusual  and  exigent  circumstances,  secured  by 
eligible paper  (short-term,  self-liquidating obligations).  It did 
not authorize  solvency/capital  support. 
o  On  March  9,  1933,  the  Emergency  Banking  Act  was  enacted.  The 
principal  draftsman  was  Walter  Wyatt,  then  general  counsel  of the 
Federal  Reserve  Board.  Title  I1  of  the  Act  is  the  Bank 
Conservation  Act,  creating  conservator-shi  ps  for  national  banks. 
See  Jones,  suDra,  at 21-22.  Section 304  of  the  Act  authorized  the RFC  (the  Federal  Reserve  is not  mentioned  in that  section)  to 
purchase  preferred  stock  of banks  "in need  of funds  for  capital 
purposes  either  in  connection  wi  th  the  organization  or 
reorganization  of  such  Cbanksl"  (emphasis  added).  Section  402 
extended  the  authority  for  emergency  advances  to member  banks  by 
Reserve  Banks  on  any  satisfactory  assets  under  Section  10(b>  for 
one  more  year.  No  authority  for  solvency/capital  support  by 
Reserve  Banks  was  included  in Section  402  or Section  403.  Section 
403  added  Section  13(13)  to the  Federal  Reserve  Act,  authorizing 
90-day  advances  to individuals,  partnerships,  and  corporations  on 
the  security  of government  obligations.  See  1933  Federal  Reserve 
Bulletin 115  et sea.  According  to Jesse  Jones,  it was  the  RFC's 
preferred  stock  purchase  program  that  reestablished  the  stability 
of  the  United  States  banking  system.  Jones,  supra,  at  33-34, 
39-40,  46-47.  Jones  writes  that Wyatt  personally  drafted the  RFC's 
preferred  stock  purchase  provision  (Section  304).  Id.  at  22. 
Therefore,  the  Board's  own  aeneral  counsel  should  be  presumed 
intentionally  to have  given  the  solvency/capi tal  support  power  to 
the  RFC,  not the  Reserve  Banks.  I  believe that Wyatt  knew  what  he 
was  doing by  conferring the  solvency/capital  support  powers  on  the 
RFC,  not the-  Reserve  Banks,  thereby  distancing  the  Federal  Reserve 
from  the  ultimately  corrupting  influence  of  pol i  ti-cized 
deci  sion-making  regarding  the  continued  exi  stence  of i  ndividual 
banks  with  governmental  solvencylcapi  tal  support.  Jones ' s  book 
makes  it clear  that  the  decisions  undertaken  by  the  RFC  in the 
preferred  stock  purchase  program  were  fi  1  led  with  pol i  ti  cal pressures,  from  both  the  Roosevelt  Administration  and  the  bankers. 
To  his  credit,  Jones  tried  to make  the  result  of  the  program 
approximate  the  1 i  kely  outcome  of  continued  free-market 
operations:  sol  vent  or  nearly  sol  vent  banks  survived,  and 
hopelessly  insolvent banks  were  liquidated. 
o  On  June  19,  1934,  former  Section  13b  was  added  to the  Federal 
Reserve  Act.  Section  13b  was  the  most  remarkable  amendment  of the 
lending provisions  in  the entire history of the  Federal  Reserve  Act 
because  it was  markedly  inconsistent  with  the  spirit and  original 
intent  of the  other  lending  provisions  of the  Act.  Under  Section 
13b,  Reserve  Banks  were  authorized,  in exceptional  circumstances, 
to make  loans  to,  to purchase  obligations  of,  and  to make  lending 
commitments  to "established industrial  or commercial  businesses"  to 
provide  the  businesses  with  "working  capital" for terms  of up  to 
five years.  A  showing  of unavailability  of such  funding "from the 
usual  sources"  was  a  prerequisite  to Reserve  Banks'  assistance 
under  Section  13b.  The  Reserve  Banks  also  were  authorized  to 
cofinance  banks'  working  capital  loans  to  businesses  for up  to  five 
years  (up  to 80  percent  of the  risk could  be  assumed  by  Reserve 
Banks).  The  total  amount  of Section  13b  assistance  was  limited to 
the  surplus  of the  Reserve  Banks  on  July  1,  1934,  together  with 
$139  mi  11  ion that was  supposed  to be  repaid to the Reserve  Banks  by 
the  Treasury  for their purchases  of  the  stock  of  the  newly-created 
Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Cot-porat  ion.  The  FDIC  was  created  under 
Section  8  of the  Banking  Act  of  1933  (June  16,  19331,  and  the Reserve  Banks  were  required  to subscribe  for  FDIC  stock  in an 
amount  equal  to one-half  of their  surplus  as  of January  1,  1933. 
See  1933  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin  385,  388.  That  is  the  only 
instance  in United  States  history  in which  Congress  required  the 
central  bank  to expend  its own  funds  to subscribe  for  more  than  a 
de  minimis  amount  of the  capital of  another,  unrelated  enterprise, 
other  than  obligations  of the  Treasury  itself.  Later  during  the 
1930s  and  the  1940s,  the  Roosevelt  Administration  often  used  the 
RFC  to fund  indirectly activities  that  the  Administration  did not 
wish  to  fund  directly  or  through  the  ordinary  appropriations 
process,  but  the  Reserve  Banks  were  not  used  for  such  purposes 
again after 1934. 
Anyway,  Section  13b  was  not  used  often  during  the  1930s--most 
working  capital  loans  to  businesses  were  made  under  similar 
provisions  of  the  RFC  Act.  It is noteworthy  that,  according  to 
Hackley  (Walter  Wyatt's  successor  as  the Board's  general  counsel  in 
1948, I  believe,  and  the  Board's  general  counsel  until  19691,  even 
Section  13b  "was  not  intended  to authorize  the  Reserve  Banks  to 
make  loans  Cmerelyl  to enable  businesses  to refinance  outstanding 
indebtedness  or  to  build,  improve,  or  replace  plant  and 
machinery."  Hackley,  sut>ra,  at 133-145,  137.  After  World  War  11, 
use  of Section  13b  did become  something  of  a  political boondoggle, 
as  did  use  of  the  RFC's  working  capital  lending  authority  to an 
even  greater extent. Both  entities made  thousands  of  working-capital  loans  during  the 
postwar  era.  Regrettably,  the  Board  participated  wi  11  ingly  in the 
continuation  of the  boondoggle,  even  attempting  to liberalize  the 
worki  ng  capi  tal lendi  ng  authori  ty by  havi  ng  Reserve  Banks  guarantee 
up  to 90  percent of banks
1  loans  to businesses  for  up  to 10  years. 
Fortunately,  the requisite  statutory changes  were  not enacted.  See 
Marriner  S.  Eccles,  Federal  Reserve  Guarantee  of  Business  Loans 
Made  Bv  Chartered  Banks,  1947  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin  521 ; 
Hackley,  supra,  at 144-145.  By  1955,  the  RFC  already  was  on  the 
road  to  abolition.  Under  a 1953  statute,  a1 1 RFC  functions were  to 
be  terminated  or  transferred  to other  agencies  by  1957,  and  final 
payment  of RFC  funds  to the  Treasury  was  to be  made  by  June  30, 
1959.  See  historical  note  under  15  U.S.C.A.  section  601  (1976). 
Thus,  in an  atmosphere  of phasing  out  the  1930s  special  lending 
agencies,  under  former  Chairman  William  McChesney  Martin,  the 
Federal  Reserve  began  in May  1955  to attempt  to withdraw  from  the 
working  capital  lending  business.  Martin  expressed  we1 1  what I 
believe  to  be  the  proper,  guiding  precept  before  a  Senate  Banking 
subcommittee  in June  1957  when  he  said  "that  the  primary  duty  of 
the Federal  Reserve  System  was  to guide monetary  and  credit policy 
and  that,  in the  Board's  opinion,  it Cis1 .  .  .  'undesirable  for the 
Federal  Reserve  to  provide  the  capital  and  participate  in 
management  functions '  in  the  C then1  proposed  small  business 
investment  companies."  Hackley,  supra,  at  145.  On  August  21, 
1958,  the  Small  Business  Investment  Company  Act  was  enacted. 
Section  601  of that  Act  repealed  Section  13b,  effective August  21, 
1959,  thereby fulfilling  Chairman Martin's expressed desire. o  The  Federal  Reserve  has  not  attempted  to renew  the  Section  13b 
authority  in any  Congress  since  the  authority  expired  in 1959. 
Thus,  with  neither  the  RFC  nor  the  Reserve  Banks'  Section  13b 
authority  on  the  scene  at present,  it requires  a  great  leap  of 
faith to assume  that Reserve  Banks  either  still have  or  ought  to 
have  solvency/capital  support  lending authority. 
o  It is clear  that  Reserve  Banks  may  make  advances  to depository 
institutions to  support  their need  for liquidity on  the  security of 
any  sound  (satisfactory)  assets,  fairly  evaluated.  It  is  less 
clear  that  Reserve  Banks  are  authorized  to  apply  creative 
evaluations  to banks'  assets  (other  than  government  securities), 
even  to support  their  liquidity  needs.  During  the  1930s,  Jesse 
Jones  applied  the  following rough  test to banks  to decide  whether 
they  were  hopelessly  insolvent  or  could  be  made  to  prosper 
eventual  ly  with a reasonable  amount  of RFC  assistance: 
--  Mark  all assets  to  current fair market  value. 
-  -  Mark  all  liabilities  to  present  value, 
excluding  capital  (which  presumably  was 
nonexistent anyway). 
--  Do  the  resulting asset  values  cover  at least 
90% of the  liabilities,  excluding capital? 
--  If yes,  then  save  the  bank  by  purchasing 
nonvoting  preferred  stock,  redeemable  in 10 
years. 
--  If  no,  liquidate  the  bank--it  is  too 
insolvent  to bother  with saving. Jones,  suDra,  at 27-28.  As  a  measure  of how  few  banks  could 
satisfy  the  Jones  test  of  solvency,  there  were  17,000 
commercial  banks  on  March  1,  1933.  By  January  1,  1934,  when 
the  FDIC  began  operating,  only 12,000  banks  remained,  and  6,000 
of them  were  borrowing at least some  of  the capital  they needed 
to satisfy  the  FDIC's  minimum  capital  requirements  from  the 
RFC.  Large  New  York  banks  borrowing  capital  from  the  RFC 
included: 
Guaranty  Trust Company - $20 million. 
Chase  National  Bank - $50 million 
(33% of pre-March 1933  capi  tall. 
Manufacturers  Trust Company  - $25 million. 
Banks  el  sewhere  borrowi  ng  capi  tal  from  the 
RFC  included: 
Bank  of  America - $27.5  mi  11  ion 
Continental  Illinois - $50 million 
(67% of pre-March 1933  capital). 
First National  Bank  of  Chicago - $25  million. 
Source:  Jones,  supra,  at  35-35,  38,  47-49.  For  perspective  on  these 
amounts,  nominal  gross  national  product  (GNP)  in 1933  was  $55.6  billion;  in 
June  1986,  nominal  GNP  was  $4.182  trillion.  Federal  budget  outlays  in 
fiscal year  1933  were  $4.6  billion;  budget  outlays as  of March  31,  1986  were 
running  at an  annual  rate  of $972  bill  ion.  Tlie  consumer  price  index  (June 
1986)  was  ,8.6  times  its 1933  level. o  Since  World  War  11,  the  Reserve  Banks  have  been  asked  to 
participate  from  time  to  time  in  solvency/capital  support 
programs  on  a  fiscal  agency  basis.  That  is,  the Reserve  Banks 
have  acted  as  guarantors  of  defense  production  loans  (V-loans) 
either  as  guarantors  subject  to reimbursement  by  the  Treasury 
or as  fiscal  agents,  and  as  fiscal  agents  for the  Treasury's 
bai  louts of Lockheed,  New  York  City  ,  and  Chrysl  er Corporation. 
See  Hackley,  supra,  at 147-161,  regarding V-loans.  All of the 
solvency/capi tal support  activities descri  bed i  n  thi  s paragraph 
were  mandated  expl i ci  tly  by  Congress. 
o  Only  once,  in wartime,  did the  Reserve  Banks  guarantee  defense 
production  loans  without  explicit  Congressional  authorization 
to do  so,  and  then it was  done  under  an  Executive  Order  of the 
President.  The  Executive  Order  was  ratified  by  Congress  11 
weeks  later,  in June  1942.  See  Hackley,  supra,  at 149.  In 
1970,  when  some  advocates  of a  bailout  for  the  Penn  Central 
Transportation  Company  attempted  to obtain  a  V-loan  for  the 
company,  Congress  responded  by  amending  the  Defense  Production 
Act of 1950  specifically  to 1  imi  t  the guaranteeing authority of 
any  agent  (read:  Reserve  Bank)  to a  maximum  of $20  million, 
"except  with  the  approval  of  Congress,  and  [to prohibit1 ... 
the  use  of the  V-loan  authority  for the  purpose  of preventing 
the  financial  insolvency or bankruptcy  of any  person  unless  the 
President  certifieCs3  that  the  insolvency  or  bankruptcy  would 
have  a direct and  substantially adverse  effect upon production."  The  President's  certification must  be  transmitted 
to Congress  at least 10  days  before  the  author1  ty may  be  used. 
Hack1  ey ,  suura,  at  152.  Thus,  the  sol  vencylcapi  tal  support 
authority  of the  Reserve  Banks  cannot  be  found  by  analogy  to 
V-loan  authority. 